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Abstract
This article contributes to the ongoing debate on native wage impacts of immigration. I propose a
mobile-fixed factor distinction as a framework in which to think about the differential impact of
immigration on various labor market groups. Skilled workers are treated as a fixed factor of production
since the strong reliance on skill certification in Germany inhibits mobility and shelters from
competition. Unskilled workers, in contrast, receive competitive wages. Using data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel for 1984-1989 I estimate panel wage regressions for groups of workers separated
by skill certification. I find that university graduates? wages increase, and the wages of workers without
postsecondary degree decrease, as the industry share of unskilled workers increases. The effect for
apprentices is ambiguous.
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Abstract
This article contributes to the ongoing debate on native wage impacts of
immigration. I propose a mobile-fixed factor distinction as a framework in which
to think about the differential impact of immigration on various labor market
groups. Skilled workers are treated as a fixed factor of production since the
strong reliance on skill certification in Germany inhibits mobility and shelters
from competition. Unskilled workers, in contrast, recieve competitive wages.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984-1989 I estimate
panel wage regressions for groups of workers separated by skill certification. I find
that university graduates’ wages increase, and the wages of workers without post-
secondary degree decrease, as the industry share of unskilled workers increases.
The effect for apprentices is ambiguous.
1 Introduction
In this article I address the following question: How does the share of unskilled workers
in one industry affect the wages of unskilled and skilled workers in that particular
industry? I perform an empirical investigation using data for West German workers
during the second half of the 1980’s. Knowledge of the answer will contribute to two,
seemingly unrelated, current debates in empirical labor economics.
i) Do native workers benefit or suffer from immigration?
ii) Why does the apprenticeship system apparently function so well in Germany?
While the first issue has been extensively discussed in the context of the US labor
market, the evidence for Germany, de-facto one of the main European immigration
countries during the last decades, is recent and still unsettled. Relevant papers are
DeNew and Zimmermann (1993, 1994), and Pischke and Velling (1994). DeNew and
Zimmermann (1994) start from the working assumption that “immigrants tend to
be substitutes for low-qualified natives” (p. 178). They find that immigration pro-
vides small gains for high-skilled workers (defined as white-collar workers) and large
detrimental effects for low skilled workers (those with blue-collar status). DeNew and
Zimmermann (1993) find that the hardest hid segment within the blue collar workers
is the group of foreign workers. In contrast, Pischke and Velling (1994), performing an
analysis based on local labor markets, find no evidence for negative wage or employ-
ment effects due to immigration. Similarly, Winter-Ebmer and Zweimu¨ller (1994a,b)
find no immigration effects in Austrian data.
In this article, I provide additional evidence on the issue. I use the same data source
and a similar methodology as DeNew and Zimmermann (1993, 1994) but I modify their
analysis in two important respects. Firstly, I use the fact that the German labor market
relies heavily on certification of skills. Certification takes the form of university degrees,
and, more importantly, vocational degrees. Thus, it seems natural to define as unskilled
those who do not possess any certified skill, and as skilled those who have obtained some
post-secondary degree. In this definition, skilled worker status is not based on current
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labor market position but rather solely on the amount and type of training a worker
has received. For the study of labor market effects of immigration, discrimination by
skill certificates appears to be a much better approach than discrimination by current
occupational status, both in terms theoretical content and measurement quality.
Secondly, I circumvent the problem of distinguishing between immigrants and foreign-
ers. While one would like to measure the first, data are available only on the latter.
The two measures differ since under current German citizenship laws second generation
immigrants frequently remain foreigners, while in terms of labor market performance
they can be expected to differ little from natives. By establishing instead the effect of
increases in unskilled labor without making arbitrary assumptions at the estimation
stage, one can then predict the effect of immigration under various assumption on the
skills of immigrants, one of them being that they are entirely unskilled.
Furthermore, the link between unskilled labor and skilled workers’ wages may provide
insight into the second question, why the German apprenticeship system apparently
functions so well, one indication being the broad support it enjoys both among labor
unions and employers (Steedman, 1993). Assume that apprenticeship certification al-
lows workers to obtain skilled worker status and that skilled workers’ wages increase
with the amount of unskilled labor. In this case, an increase the amount of unskilled
workers in the economy is in the interest of skilled workers. The obvious way of achiev-
ing this increase is through immigration. In this framework, immigration is welcomed
by native workers, most of whom are skilled, and by capitalists alike. Immigration
might have been instrumental in maintaining high post-apprenticeship wages during
the last decades.
In this article, I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to provide an em-
pirical investigation into the link between the quantity of unskilled workers and skilled
workers’ wages. Firstly, however, I will outline a theoretical background that will help
in the interpretation of the findings.
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2 Skilled Worker’s Wages as a Rent
The relation between wages and employment has traditionally been analysed in a pro-
duction function framework where different types of labor (for instance, skilled and
unskilled) are treated as distinct inputs and where real wages equal marginal products.
Cross wage elasticities are then determined by the underlying production technology.
Two factor are q-substitutes if an increase in the supply of one input lowers the price
of the other input, and q-complements if the increased supply raises the other input’s
price. The technology may be modelled explicitly, taking into account the appropri-
ate cross-equations restrictions (as, for instance, in Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994)), or
underlie a reduced form approach as in DeNew and Zimmermann (1993, 1994).
I will explore an alternative framework which conforms more closely to the strong
reliance of German labor market institutions on certified skills and which does not
require wages to equal marginal product. The basic idea is that skill certificates in-
troduce specificity that prevents occupational mobility of skilled workers in the short
run. Hence, skilled labor is an immobile factor of production and has to be treated
as fixed. Unskilled workers, in contrast, have little or no occupation specific human
capital and are, therefore, more mobile. There is ample evidence that the German
labor market contains substantial barriers to mobility for skilled workers. A detailed
account of the impermeability of the German system is given in Hamilton and Hur-
relmann (1994). Specificity is introduced through curricula and skill certification, and
perpetuated in collective bargaining agreements that define job profiles and skill re-
quirements. Hamilton and Hurrelmann point out that employment in most of the close
to 400 apprenticeship occupations is legally reserved for certified completers.
The theoretical consequences of this assumption can be laid out in a simple two sector-
two factor model. There is a fixed amount of skilled labor employed in sectors A and
B. Unskilled workers (that is workers without occupation specific training) can move
freely between the two sectors. The labor market equilibrium is given in Figure 1.
——————————– Insert Figure 1 about here ——————————–
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Firms hire unskilled workers up to the point where the wage rate equals their marginal
product. Any unskilled worker wage differential between the two sectors is eliminated
through labor mobility. Unskilled workers move from the low wage sector to the high
wage sector even in the short run. If the total amount of unskilled labor is ON0, then
OE0 workers are employed in sector A, while E0N0 workers are employed in sector B.
Their wage is w0. Skilled workers receive the rent, that is the value of total production
minus the wagebill paid to unskilled workers. The rent corresponds to area ABw0 for
skilled workers in sector A and to area BDG for skilled workers in sector B. The
essential assumption is that skilled workers are effectively sheltered from competition
through the barriers to mobility. Hence, they are not paid by their marginal product
but rather receive a rent.
Now assume that the quantity of unskilled workers increases from ON0 to ON1. The
equilibrium wage falls to w1. As a consequence, the rent received by skilled workers
unambiguously increases in both sectors, to ACw1 for workers in sector A and to CFH
for workers in sector B. Hence, the following result holds: the specific factor model
predicts that the return to the specific factor will increase when the quantity of the
unspecific factor increases. While this model does not explicitly take into account
capital, the main result would hold if capital was introduced. In this case, both skilled
workers and capital have to be treated as fixed factors, and they share the rent. While
the shares going to skilled labor and capital are indeterminate in this model, in all
but pathological cases an increase in the total available rent will benefit both fixed
factors. Therefore, the main result still holds. Note, that if the increase in unskilled
labor is caused by immigration, then the area IBC corresponds to the immigration
surplus (Borjas, 1995). In the Borjas model, however, the immigration surplus accrues
to capitalists only, whereas here it goes to both capitalists and skilled workers.
Unfortunately, the observed positive correlation between the quantity of unskilled work-
ers and skilled workers’ wages is compatible with the rent model as well as with the
competitive two-factor model under complementarity. Neither model is identified from
observations on these two variables alone. That is not to say that the two models are
indistinguishable. For instance, the rent model predicts that there is no employment
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variation for skilled workers, whereas in the competitive model, employment of skilled
workers will increase as unskilled labor increases. Note, that it is the assumption of
constant skilled labor in the rent model that allows us to use unskilled labor shares
instead of levels; in the competitive model by contrast, the use of shares generates some
potential problems (which are neglected in Zimmermann and DeNew 1994). A further
difference between the two models is that only the rent model provides an unambiguous
prediction for all industries. In the competitive model one might find some industries
for which complementarity does not hold. In such industries, the quantity of unskilled
labor will have no effect on, or even decrease, skilled workers’ wages.
A rigorous test between the two hypotheses is beyond the scope of this article, and I
adopt the rent approach as a maintained hypothesis. It appears to be particularly well
suited at accounting for the institutional structure of the German labor market with
its strong credential system and its restricted access to skilled jobs. The hypothesis to
be tested is whether or not apprentices profit, and unskilled workers suffer, from an
increased presence of unskilled workers in their industry.
3 Data and Methodology
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on individual level data on full-time work-
ers drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The annual household
survey covers the period 1984 to 1989. The analysis does not exclude individuals with
partial sample presence only. For each year, I observe hourly wages, a set of socio-
economic characteristics like education level (years of general schooling) and years of
work experience, and a set of characteristics of the present employment like public vs.
private sector employment, firm size, and industry.
It is essential for the analysis to undertake a meaningful classification of workers into
“unskilled” and “skilled” workers. I distinguish two types of skilled workers, those
with a completed vocational degree, and those with a university degree. Unskilled
workers are those without any skill certification. The first column of Table 1. shows
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the distribution of qualifications for full-time workers in Germany during the period
1984 to 1989. The proportions have been calculated on the basis of the German Socio-
Economic Panel, where weighting factors have been applied to correct for the non-
representativeness of the panel (the most important source of which is an oversampling
of foreigners, or “Guestworkers”). It turns out that more than 2 out of 3 workers possess
a vocational degree. The remaining third is roughly equally divided between unskilled
workers and workers with university degree, with a slightly larger proportion being
unskilled (ca. 16 vs. ca. 14 percent). The vast majority (76 %) of unskilled workers
has foreign citizenship. There is no clearly distinguishable trend in these proportions
for the observed time period.
The second column gives the mean hourly wages by skill level. For the three groups the
real wage gain during the six year period varies from 9 to 11 percent. The wage differ-
entials by skill level are rather stable. Hourly wages of workers with vocational degree
exceed those of unskilled workers by around 25 percent, whereas the corresponding
premium is 85 percent for university graduates. University graduates earn a premium
of about 47 percent over workers with vocational degree only. The wage differentials
for post-secondary degrees are somewhat smaller than the ones reported in Abraham
and Houseman (1994), which might be due to the fact that they use annual earnings
and exclude female workers.
The rent model predicts that the market forces that tend to equalize unskilled workers
wages in the short run are not affecting skilled workers wages. Hence, we would expect
to observe a more compressed wage structure for unskilled than for skilled workers.
Table 1 gives two measures of dispersion of the distribution of hourly wages, the coeffi-
cient of variation and the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile. The latter ratio varies
between 2.2 for unskilled workers and 2.3-2.4 for skilled workers, either with vocational
or with university degree. The increase in dispersion is more markedly traced by the
coefficient of variation: The range is 0.30 - 0.35 for unskilled workers, 0.37-0.41 for
vocational graduates, and 0.35 - 0.44 for university graduates. In the present context,
it is important to note that while the wage dispersion does not vary dramatically by
skill level, a slight increase can be noted for skilled as opposed to unskilled workers, an
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increase that conforms to the fixed/mobile factor interpretation.
Although the aggregate share of unskilled workers of ca. 16 percent displays little
intertemporal variation, the industry-specific variation, both between and within in-
dustries, is much larger. The GSOEP industry classification uses 34 industries listed
in the first column of Table 2. Using the six cross sections, I can calculate for each
industry and year the ratio of the number of unskilled workers to the number of all
workers in that industry and year. Table 2 shows these ratios for all industries and
years. Again, the original data are weighted to correct for sample selection and to
obtain better estimates of the population means.
The last column of Table 2 gives an idea about the class sizes involved, taking as an
example the year of 1984. The number of observed workers in each industry varies from
1 in fishing to 448 in the iron and steel industry. Clearly, the estimate of the industry
specific share of unskilled labor is the more precise the more observations are available.
In the regression analysis that follows observations with industry cell occupations of
9 or less are discarded (Experiments with different minimal cell requirements did not
significantly alter the results). Within the industries of 150 or more observations, the
clothing trade has the highest share of unskilled workers with an average of ca. 30
percent, followed by the iron and steel industry. The industries with the smallest
share of unskilled workers are education (5-12 percent), followed by health services.
Due to the relatively modest sizes of the cell populations, the standard deviations of
the estimated proportions, and consequently their year to year variations, are large.
However, there are persistent industry differentials as well as discernible time trends
which will allow to identify the wage effect of unskilled labor in a regression framework.
In particular, I will run standard Mincerian earnings regressions for subsamples clas-
sified by skill-level, and focus on the effect of the macro variable “share of unskilled
workers” by identifying the individual’s industry affiliation and merging in the corre-
sponding share. To give the estimated coefficient of the ”unskilled share” any mean-
ingful interpretation, several considerations have to be taken into account. Firstly,
individual wages might be affected by unobservables which are correlated with the in-
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dustry affiliation. I will use a random effects model with individual specific effect ui to
account for this problem:
wit = x
′
itβ + εit + ui
where wit is the log of the hourly wage for individual I at time t, xit is a set of covariates,
E(u2i ) = σ
2
u and E(uiεit) = 0. I estimate the model with LIMDEP, using an unbalanced
panel design. I did reject a fixed effects specification on a-priori grounds, since I want
to measure the effect of variables that do not vary over time.
Secondly, industries differ in technology. For instance, industries with low capital
intensity might have both a large share of unskilled workers and low skilled workers’
wages. Since I want to isolate the effect of an increase in unskilled labor on wages,
ceteris paribus, it is necessary to control for industry specific effects through industry
dummies. Unfortunately, LIMDEP has a hard coded limitation which restricts the size
of the product of the number of group means and the number of regressors (Greene
1992). This forced me to aggregate some industries so that in the end, I use 20 industry
dummies.
Thirdly, the industry share of unskilled workers may be endogenous and thus corre-
lated with the error term. If the supply of skilled labor is fixed in the short run, then
industry specific demand shocks will lead to contemporaneous and equi-directed ad-
justments in both skilled workers wages and shares of unskilled workers. Therefore, I
also perform instrumented regressions, where the actual unskilled share is replaced by
a predicted share. The auxiliary regression for predicting the share uses the full sample
and includes industry dummies (34), industry dummies interacted with the aggregate
share of unskilled workers (which postulates that an exogenous increase in unskilled
labor is evenly spread over the industries), and the lagged share of unskilled workers.
The auxiliary regression has an R2 of 0.825. The results are reported with and without
instrumentation.
Fourthly, there is a potential problem of measurement error in the share variable I use.
The variable is constructed from the GSOEP and mostly based on small to moderate
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sample sizes. While I do correct for non-representativeness by applying sample weights
provided in the data set, the sampling error is still large. One alternative would be to
use external information as provided for instance in publications by the Statistisches
Bundesamt. Unfortunately, there exist no published data that match my definition of
skilled and unskilled labor, that is, educational attainment rather than current status.
To keep the measurements consistent, I have to use the constructed share variable. As
to the implicit measurement problem, I refer to Fuller (1987) who shows that the t-test
of a regression coefficient is unbiased in the presence of measurement error, as long as
the maintained hypothesis is β = 0. While measurement error reduces the power of
the test, this does not invalidate my analysis. To the contrary, rejection of the null
hypothesis provides strong indication for the link between unskilled labor and skilled
workers’ wages.
4 Results
Separate regressions were run for 5 samples: (1) workers with vocational degree; (2)
workers with apprenticeship degree; (3) workers with an apprenticeship in industry and
trade; (4) workers with university degree; and (5) unskilled workers. The German sys-
tem of vocational training distinguishes two types of institutions: (full-time) vocational
schools and apprenticeships. For ca. 60 percent of workers with vocational degree, the
apprenticeship degree is the only vocational degree. While the first sample contains
workers with any type of vocational degree, the second sample includes workers with
apprenticeship degree only.
The third sample forms a subsample of the apprenticeship sample. It contains appren-
tices in vocations that are generally considered to be of higher quality. The German
apprenticeship system is organized by training sectors running across industries, the
most important of which are the crafts sector and the industry and trade sector. On
average, the latter provides higher quality apprenticeships in terms of human capital
investment, skill content, and advancement opportunities (Soskice 1994). Thus, it is
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for these apprentices that one would expect the rent model to apply most clearly. Un-
fortunately, the GSOEP does not contain direct information on the training sector. I
use indirect information given by white collar status in the current employment, as-
suming that there is a (close) positive correlation between a high quality apprenticeship
outside the crafts sector and current white collar status. Given the data limitation,
this appears to be a reasonable way to discriminate between low and high quality
apprenticeships.
The regression results are given in Tables 3a and 3b. For every subsample, two dif-
ferent models were estimated: a random effects panel model with the industry share
of unskilled workers and a random effects panel model with an instrumented industry
share. The instrumented version uses the lagged share of unskilled workers and thus
has a reduced number of observations. The explanatory variables include 20 industry
dummies (the coefficients of which are not displayed in the tables), years of general
schooling (varying from 8 to 13 years), years of labor market experience, gender, nation-
ality, a dummy for public sector employment, three dummies for firm size (measured
by the number of employees), and the share of unskilled workers. Based on a Lagrange
multiplier test statistic (which has a χ2(1) distribution under the null hypothesis of
no random effects), a pooled regression without random effects is rejected against the
random effects specification for all the subsamples. Except for the share of unskilled
workers the coefficients are very similar with and without instrumentation.
In particular, the effects of the standard human capital variables schooling, experience
and experience squared have the expected signs and are comparable in magnitude to the
effects found in previous studies for Germany. The estimated return for one additional
year of schooling varies between 7% for unskilled workers and 10% for apprentices. The
experience-earnings profile is concave with a maximum between 30 and 35 years of ex-
perience. There is a persistent gender wage differential which is smallest for university
graduates (10%) and largest for unskilled workers (22%). The wage discount for public
sector employment increases with skill level. While there is no wage differential for
unskilled workers, workers with vocational degree earn 4% less, and university gradu-
ates 15% less, if employed in the public sector. This negative effect, which has been
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paid little attention to in the previous literature, might reflect a compensating wage
differential for job security.
The coefficients for firm size repeat the well established evidence for higher pay in larger
firms (Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1991). This result is compatible with efficiency wage
arguments according to which larger firms have bigger incentives to overpay since they
face larger monitoring costs. The effect of nationality on wages is not clear cut. While
Germans with university degree earn more than their non-German counterparts, Ger-
man apprentices and unskilled workers earn less. The effect for workers with vocational
degree is insignificant. Given the aforementioned heterogeneity of the group of foreign-
ers that includes both immigrants and second generation foreigners, these inconclusive
results do not come as a surprise.
Next, I turn to a discussion of the effects of unskilled labor in one’s industry. For
workers with vocational degree, the industry share of unskilled workers is statistically
significant and negative. To assess the economic importance I will throughout this
discussion refer to the predicted effects of a 10 percentage points increase of the industry
share of unskilled workers, i.e. an increase from 10 to 20 percent, or from 30 to 40
percent. Such an increase will lower the wages of workers with vocational degree
by one to three percent, depending on whether one uses the uninstrumented or the
instrumented regression (Table 3a). A significantly negative effect of similar magnitude
is observed for the subgroup of workers with apprenticeship degree. However, no effect,
either positive or negative, can be found for the subgroup of apprentices in industry
and trade, i.e. for workers with a high-quality apprenticeship.
Table 3b shows that workers with university degree definitely profit from the presence
of unskilled workers in their industry. A ten percentage points increase will increase
their wages by a sizable four to five percent. The same increase in the share of unskilled
workers will reduce unskilled workers’ wages by two to three percent. It is worthwhile
to note that the proportion of explained variation to the total variation in wages is
very similar across models varying from 30 to 36 % (except for the industry and trade
sub-sample). The somewhat higher variation in wages observed for skilled workers can
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thus be, at least partially, explained by the regression function, rather than entering
the residual.
5 Discussion
The rent model predicts that skilled workers’ wages increase and unskilled workers’
wages decrease as the industry share of unskilled workers increases. While a casual
inspection of the German labor market institutions with their strong reliance on skill
certification favors the rent model on a-priori grounds, the empirical results are am-
biguous. Using panel data for 1984 to 1989 and instrumental variable techniques, I
estimate separate earnings equations for skilled and unskilled workers. The essential
findings are robust with respect to the chosen estimation techniques. The industry
share of unskilled labor has a negative effect on wages of both unskilled workers and
workers with vocational degree. Given this result and assuming the validity of the rent
model, one has to conclude that a vocational degree does not automatically lead to a
skilled worker status, as I initially hypothesised.
While heterogeneities in vocational degrees are a potential problem, the finding of a
negative wage effect does uphold for the subgroup of apprentices. Only when restricting
the sample to apprentices in industry and trade (that is workers with current white
collar status) could no negative effect be detected. However, there is also no evidence
for a positive effect predicted by the specificity of skilled work. The wages of university
graduates, in contrast, do in fact profit: a 10 percentage point increase of the share of
unskilled workers leads to a four to five percent wage increase. Workers with university
degree receive a rent.
The initially pronounced hypothesis, that the apprenticeship system might have found
indirect support by a contemporaneous inflow of unskilled workers through immigra-
tion, is not supported by this empirical analysis, and further work is needed to study
the position of workers with vocational degree. Such work could exploit information
on regional variation in the share of unskilled workers (which is not possible with the
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Public Use SOEP version), or establishment data as in Winter-Ebmer and Zweimu¨ller
(1994a).
Finally, I want to point out the implications of my findings for the literature on native
wage impact of immigration. For a “worst case scenario”, assume that immigration is
completely unskilled (I noted before that most of the unskilled workers in the German
labor market are foreigners). Such immigration will hurt unskilled workers (both native
and foreign) in Germany since these workers face the direct competition of immigrants.
Workers with university degree are effectively shielded from the competition, and they
can reap a rent. The situation for workers with apprenticeship degree, the bulk of the
work force, is not clear cut. While I find wage effects that are statistically significant,
they are much smaller than the ones found in DeNew and Zimmermann (1994) in
a study comparing blue and white collar workers. The overall effect of, say, a one
percentage point increase in the foreigner share is a reduction of native wages by less
than a quarter of a percent. This minimal and economically insignificant native wage
impact is, as theory tells us, likely to be more than offset by gains to capital owners.
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TABLE 1.: The Distribution of Hourly Wages for German
Full-Time Workers by Educational Status.
Percent1 Mean2 v3 p90/p104
A. UNSKILLED WORKERS
1984 0.163 13.23 0.306 2.237
1985 0.155 13.14 0.350 2.221
1986 0.162 13.47 0.311 2.239
1987 0.161 14.06 0.319 2.262
1988 0.155 14.75 0.302 2.034
1989 0.168 14.42 0.334 2.277
B. VOCATIONAL DEGREE
1984 0.715 16.45 0.368 2.352
1985 0.697 16.47 0.373 2.306
1986 0.694 17.15 0.376 2.456
1987 0.697 17.57 0.409 2.394
1988 0.685 18.22 0.387 2.372
1989 0.691 18.03 0.372 2.333
C. UNIVERSITY DEGREE
1984 0.122 24.03 0.365 2.312
1985 0.148 24.42 0.352 2.230
1986 0.144 24.97 0.414 2.400
1987 0.142 26.78 0.443 2.312
1988 0.160 26.91 0.413 2.303
1989 0.141 26.56 0.364 2.124
The reported numbers are based upon the author’s calculations using data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel. Sample weights have been used. The cross-sectional
sample sizes are N84 = 4060, N85 = 3466, N86 = 3292, N87 = 3331, N88 = 3103 and
N89 = 3553.
1 Percentage of sample with a given educational attainment (using sample weights).
2 Real Hourly Wages (1985=100);
3 Coefficient of Variation v = σ/x¯.
4 Ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of hourly wages for full-time workers.
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TABLE 2.: Industry Codes and Shares of Unskilled Workers.
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 N84
1 Agriculture and forestry 0.338 0.437 0.579 0.367 0.634 0.620 47
2 Fishing industry 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
3 Energy and water 0.119 0.095 0.088 0.181 0.081 0.064 47
4 Mining 0.283 0.058 0.178 0.222 0.320 0.159 32
5 Chemical industry 0.184 0.191 0.179 0.171 0.154 0.162 156
6 Synthetic fiber industry 0.347 0.336 0.301 0.303 0.414 0.326 76
7 Clay, stone, earth 0.197 0.181 0.188 0.247 0.182 0.223 70
8 Iron and steel industry 0.278 0.227 0.202 0.186 0.197 0.232 448
9 Mechanical engineering 0.158 0.147 0.130 0.145 0.132 0.165 387
10 Electrical engineering 0.207 0.200 0.201 0.227 0.203 0.195 260
11 Wood, paper, and print 0.182 0.185 0.186 0.216 0.265 0.233 152
12 Clothing trade 0.371 0.296 0.318 0.263 0.282 0.254 172
13 Food industry 0.156 0.173 0.233 0.228 0.134 0.292 145
14 Construction 0.227 0.207 0.236 0.203 0.228 0.184 286
15 Construction related 0.048 0.040 0.053 0.050 0.051 0.059 113
16 Wholesale 0.198 0.236 0.211 0.261 0.245 0.148 87
17 Trading agents 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3
18 Retail 0.119 0.113 0.144 0.181 0.193 0.204 199
19 Federal train system 0.219 0.151 0.085 0.095 0.074 0.102 56
20 Federal postal system 0.113 0.112 0.095 0.097 0.145 0.097 66
21 Other traffic systems 0.134 0.146 0.147 0.184 0.117 0.114 122
22 Banks, savings institutions 0.076 0.118 0.111 0.109 0.143 0.147 80
23 Insurance companies 0.107 0.107 0.099 0.095 0.117 0.090 44
24 Restaurants 0.300 0.355 0.440 0.243 0.271 0.234 84
25 Service industry 0.056 0.086 0.095 0.173 0.148 0.059 35
26 Janitors, waste removers 0.544 0.557 0.697 0.392 0.295 0.298 22
27 Education, sport 0.053 0.042 0.051 0.085 0.092 0.119 175
28 Health services 0.100 0.118 0.093 0.109 0.122 0.112 157
29 Legal services 0.014 0.015 0.072 0.019 0.053 0.052 70
30 Other services 0.473 0.155 0.121 0.217 0.071 0.019 5
31 Churches, associations 0.110 0.128 0.127 0.099 0.110 0.111 91
32 Private households 0.205 0.712 0.740 0.210 0.020 1.000 4
33 Regional authority 0.121 0.107 0.129 0.114 0.095 0.128 333
34 Social security 0.011 0.010 0.019 0.022 0.018 0.163 38
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TABLE 3a. Earnings Regressions by Skill Level1
Vocational Degree Apprenticeship Apprenticeship I&T2
Constant 1.4255 1.4636 1.4563 1.4674 1.3310 1.4136
( 0.0399) ( 0.0421) ( 0.0578) ( 0.0608) ( 0.0781) ( 0.0823)
General Schooling (yrs.) 0.0961 0.0961 0.0988 0.0997 0.0994 0.0928
( 0.0040) ( 0.0042) ( 0.0056) ( 0.0059) ( 0.0069) ( 0.0072)
Experience 0.0366 0.0378 0.0383 0.0405 0.0468 0.0452
( 0.0011) ( 0.0012) ( 0.0014) ( 0.0015) ( 0.0018) ( 0.0020)
Experience squared -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006
( 0.0000) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0000)
Female -0.1473 -0.1457 -0.1332 -0.1293 -0.1238 -0.1321
( 0.0104) ( 0.0108) ( 0.0131) ( 0.0137) ( 0.0166) ( 0.0172)
Public sector employment -0.0449 -0.0497 -0.0367 -0.0442 -0.0332 -0.0370
( 0.0102) ( 0.0103) ( 0.0135) ( 0.0132) ( 0.0153) ( 0.0159)
20-200 employees 0.0745 0.0704 0.0727 0.0668 0.0819 0.0956
( 0.0081) ( 0.0083) ( 0.0097) ( 0.0096) ( 0.0123) ( 0.0135)
200-2000 employees 0.1122 0.1047 0.1154 0.1108 0.1062 0.1262
( 0.0090) ( 0.0092) ( 0.0110) ( 0.0109) ( 0.0142) ( 0.0155)
> 2000 employees 0.1302 0.1235 0.1386 0.1318 0.1208 0.1441
( 0.0094) ( 0.0096) ( 0.0116) ( 0.0117) ( 0.0147) ( 0.0160)
German 0.0148∗ 0.0128∗ -0.0644 -0.0705 -0.0357∗ -0.0232∗
( 0.0120) ( 0.0126) ( 0.0196) ( 0.0206) ( 0.0353) ( 0.0362)
Unskilled worker share -0.1144 -0.1349 -0.0041∗
( 0.0378) ( 0.0477) ( 0.0549)
Predicted share3 -0.3017 -0.2677 -0.0264∗
( 0.0422) ( 0.0519) ( 0.0712)
R-squared 0.364 0.358 0.365 0.356 0.473 0.485
LM -statistic 8319 6064 4618 3520 2544 1917
Observations 12306 10208 7201 6009 3251 2716
NOTES:
1 Standard errors ares in parentheses; ∗ insignificant at the 5-percent level; Dependent
variable is log of hourly wages; All regressions use a random effects specification.
2 Workers with completed apprenticeship in industry and trade.
3 The instrumental regressions include industry dummies (34), industry dummies inter-
acted with the aggregate share of unskilled workers, and the lagged share of unskilled
workers.
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TABLE 3b. Earnings Regressions by Skill Level
University Unskilled
Constant 1.5143 1.5227 1.6636 1.6976
( 0.1331) ( 0.1364) ( 0.0845) ( 0.0900)
General Schooling (yrs.) 0.0649 0.0645 0.0701 0.0706
( 0.0117) ( 0.0120) ( 0.0088) ( 0.0094)
Experience 0.0587 0.0600 0.0267 0.0271
( 0.0033) ( 0.0036) ( 0.0019) ( 0.0020)
Experience squared -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0004
( 0.0001) ( 0.0001) ( 0.0000) ( 0.0000)
Female -0.1015 -0.0977 -0.2153 -0.2173
( 0.0336) ( 0.0343) ( 0.0125) ( 0.0131)
Public sector employment -0.1508 -0.1564 -0.0039∗ -0.0046∗
( 0.0258) ( 0.0250) ( 0.0192) ( 0.0195)
20-200 employees 0.0664 0.0461 0.0800 0.0852
( 0.0219) ( 0.0210) ( 0.0128) ( 0.0130)
200-2000 employees 0.0714 0.0624 0.1539 0.1584
( 0.0240) ( 0.0235) ( 0.0133) ( 0.0135)
> 2000 employees 0.0826 0.0724 0.1788 0.1817
( 0.0213) ( 0.0205) ( 0.0143) ( 0.0145)
German 0.1817 0.1922 -0.0602 -0.0608
( 0.0579) ( 0.0591) ( 0.0155) ( 0.0162)
Unskilled workers share 0.4262 -0.2148
( 0.1151) ( 0.0477)
Predicted share 0.4641 -0.3309
( 0.1238) ( 0.0559)
R-squared 0.304 0.296 0.336 0.348
LM -statistic 1299 961 2027 1418
Observations 2001 1697 4992 4082
NOTES: See Table 3a.
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